From Adesuwa Tsan, Abuja
When Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in as President on May 29, 2015, Nigeria achieved a historic political milestone; a peaceful transition from a ruling party to an opposition party. With his victory came a sweeping win for the spanking new All Progressives Congress (APC) in both chambers of the National Assembly. Many expected this feat to deliver seamless executive-legislative collaboration. Instead, what followed was a tale of two Assemblies: the fiery independence of the Saraki-Dogara era and the highly beneficial partnership under Lawan and Gbajabiamila. Together, they shaped Buhari’s presidency and Nigeria’s democratic trajectory.
The cracks emerged early. On June 9, 2015, Bukola Saraki and Yakubu Dogara emerged as Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives respectively, against the APC’s declared candidates: Ahmed Lawan and Femi Gbajabiamila. Their victory, which was achieved through massive support by opposition lawmakers, blindsided the party leadership and the presidency. The friction that characterised the 8th National Assembly started building from this point, Saraki later said he was not elected to be a rubber stamp, while Dogara described their emergence as a sign of legislative maturity. The Buhari administration, which had not fully grasped the depth of internal party rivalries, was left scrambling for a hold.
Over the next four years, the 8th National Assembly would assert its independence unequivocally. It passed over 200 bills in the Senate and more than 1,600 in the House, a record achievement, ranging from procurement reforms to financial oversight laws. Yet, the relationship with the executive remained confrontational. Budget cycles were particularly fraught. The 2016 budget, Buhari’s first, was submitted in December 2015 but not signed into law until May 2016. This delay disrupted capital project implementation and paralysed public sector planning.
In a 2019 television interview, Buhari criticised the delays sharply, stating: “I told them (Saraki and Dogara) … how do they feel to hold the country to ransom for seven months without passing the budget? … They are not hurting me; they are hurting the country.” He concluded with a scathing verdict: “I rate them very, very low… in terms of patriotism.”
But Saraki and Dogara defended their approach. The Speaker argued that the delays stemmed not from legislative sabotage but executive inefficiency. According to Dogara, the 2019 budget was presented on December 19, just 12 days before the year ended, leaving little room for meaningful scrutiny. He added that high-stakes national allocations inevitably sparked prolonged debates, as they reflected competing national priorities. Dogara maintained that the executive’s failure to present budgets on time was a key cause of delays.
The conflict peaked with the signing of the 2018 budget. Buhari accused the National Assembly of “mutilating” the appropriation by removing N347 billion worth of executive projects and inserting ₦578 billion of their own. He described these additions as “not properly conceptualised” and lacking cost-benefit analysis. Although he still signed the bill, the rebuke was public and pointed.
Despite the tension, there were moments of truce. In April 2016, Buhari met privately with Saraki, Dogara, and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo to resolve the budget impasse. Saraki told reporters afterward that they had found a way forward, and the budget was eventually signed within days. Nevertheless, the damage to public trust had already been done. Delays in budget implementation slowed infrastructure projects, weakened investor confidence, and led to cash flow problems across ministries.
The 8th Assembly also made its mark through strong oversight. It blocked the confirmation of Ibrahim Magu as EFCC chairman, challenged the executive on policy implementation, and occasionally summoned top officials, including attempts to get Buhari himself to address the legislature on worsening security situation in the country. Although the president did not appear, the moves underlined the legislature’s assertiveness.
By the end of Buhari’s first term, it was clear the presidency had learned a political lesson. Ahead of the inauguration of the 9th Assembly in 2019, the executive became deeply involved in succession planning. Buhari personally backed Ahmed Lawan for Senate President and Femi Gbajabiamila for Speaker, lobbying lawmakers and APC leaders to avoid a repeat of 2015. His efforts paid off. On June 11, 2019, both men were elected with wide margins, ushering in what Buhari called “a new dawn.”
This signaled a period of smoother governance and a seamless executive-legislature relations. The 9th Assembly prioritised almost everything Buhari wanted including early budget passage, helping to restore Nigeria to the January-to-December fiscal cycle. The 2020 budget was passed and signed in record time, and subsequent budgets saw significantly reduced delays. So highly compliant to the wishes of the executive was the 9th Assembly that they quickly earned the tag, ‘rubberstamp.’ However, Lawan and Gbajabiamila, while emphasising cooperation, rejected the label of a “rubber stamp” legislature. Gbajabiamila explained that building bridges was more productive than burning them and stressed that oversight had not been compromised.
One of the most consequential achievements of the 9th Assembly was the passage of the Electoral Act Amendment Bill, signed into law by Buhari in February 2022. The new law introduced electronic transmission of results and enhanced INEC’s operational independence. Buhari praised the legislation, calling it a step forward in electoral transparency and credibility. However, he raised concerns about Section 84(12), which barred political appointees from contesting party primaries unless they resigned. Buhari asked the National Assembly to reconsider that section, arguing it conflicted with constitutional rights, but the legislature stood firm.
The 9th Assembly also showed capacity for oversight during moments of national distress. In early 2023, the country faced acute cash shortages due to the naira redesign policy implemented by the Central Bank of Nigeria. The House of Representatives acted swiftly and passed resolutions urging a temporary suspension of the policy to ease public suffering. While the executive initially stood by the policy, the Assembly’s intervention put additional pressure on the CBN and demonstrated its continued relevance as a voice of the people.
On fiscal matters, Buhari’s borrowing to fund large-scale infrastructure projects, particularly from China, was supported by the legislature, with questions over proper scrutiny. Lawmakers approved several multi-billion-naira loans but demanded detailed implementation reports and occasionally summoned ministers and agency heads to account for project performance.
Yet, even in this relatively cooperative environment, tensions reappeared. In December 2022, Buhari accused the National Assembly of inflating the 2023 budget by inserting projects worth N770 billion that had not been part of the original submission. He signed the budget into law but directed the Finance Ministry to engage with lawmakers to reconcile the differences.
Overall, Buhari’s relationship with the National Assembly evolved significantly over his two terms. The 8th Assembly under Saraki and Dogara prioritised institutional autonomy, pushed back against executive dominance, and set a new tone for legislative independence. It also introduced Nigerians to a more visible and assertive National Assembly, with budget scrutiny and legislative oversight becoming topics of public discourse.
The 9th Assembly, by contrast, was more of collaboration and alignment. Under Lawan and Gbajabiamila, it focused on timely budget passage, landmark reforms like the Electoral Act, and policy synergy with the executive. While critics accused it of being too compliant, its leaders insisted that their approach was driven by a desire for stability, not subservience.
From an institutional perspective, Buhari’s presidency was a period of growth for Nigeria’s executive-legislature cooperation. The turbulent early years underscored the importance of inter-branch negotiation, while the later years demonstrated the benefits of strategic partnership. The cumulative result was swifter legislation passage, more organised budget cycles and passage which was very central to national policymaking.
As Nigerians reflect on his legacy, including how he managed Nigeria’s democratic institutions following his death on July 13, many remember that his administration was criticised for slow economic growth, rising debt, and persistent insecurity, but his evolving relationship with the National Assembly offers important lessons. His presidency showed that democracy cannot thrive on executive power alone, and that the legislature, whether assertive or cooperative, remains a crucial partner in national development. Saraki and Dogara reminded the country that the National Assembly is not a political appendage but an independent institution with a constitutional mandate. Lawan and Gbajabiamila demonstrated that constructive cooperation can unlock progress. Together, these contrasting styles illustrated the complex, often difficult, but ultimately necessary balance between independence and collaboration in a functioning democracy.
For Nigeria, the Buhari years sharpened the lines of constitutional responsibility, tested the limits of political patience, and delivered significant reforms. In the end, Buhari’s legacy with the National Assembly is not defined by harmony or hostility alone, but by the maturity it brought to Nigeria’s democratic experiment.
