Members of the National Transportation Safety Board speak before an investigative hearing about the January midair collision between an American Airlines regional jet and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
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Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images
Three days of hearings held by federal investigators this week shed new light on the deadly midair collision last January between an American Airlines regional jet and an Army Black Hawk helicopter just outside Washington, D.C.
Everyone on board both the jet and the helicopter — 67 people — were killed in the crash. It was the deadliest U.S. aviation accident in decades.
Here are some of the biggest revelations from the National Transportation Safety Board hearing.
The Army helicopter’s altimeter may have been wrong — and that wasn’t unusual
On the night of Jan. 29, the three-person crew aboard the Black Hawk was flying a training mission near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) in Arlington, Va., heading south along the Potomac River. Meanwhile, the PSA Airlines flight out of Wichita, Kan., with two pilots, two flight attendants and 60 passengers was approaching the airport for landing.
The two aircraft collided at about 8:48 p.m. ET, falling into the frigid river below.
Investigators say the collision occurred at an altitude of 278 feet — even though the Army helicopter shouldn’t have been flying above 200 feet on that portion of the route. NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy has previously said the Black Hawk pilots might not have been aware of how high they were because their barometric altimeter may have been displaying the wrong altitude.
Family members of the victims of American Airlines flight 5342 listen to opening statements during the National Transportation Safety Board investigative hearing in Washington on Wednesday.
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Rod Lamkey/AP
And Army representatives said this week that it wasn’t unusual for barometric altimeters to be off by that much.
“In my experience, a difference of 80 feet or so between the radar altitude and the barometric altitude would not be cause for alarm,” U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis told investigators.
Radar altimeters measure the distance between an aircraft and the ground, while barometric altimeters use air pressure to estimate altitude.
NTSB member J. Todd Inman pressed others from the Army and from Sikorsky Aircraft, which manufactures Black Hawk helicopters, about why the barometric altimeters used weren’t more accurate, especially since Army helicopters sometimes pass near civilian flights.
“You just told me, I believe, all of the equipment in this manufacturing process is within the tolerances for safety. How much is that tolerance?” Inman asked. “I think it should be zero.”
The military representatives said at the hearing that the Army is considering changes to the flight manual to let pilots know about discrepancies with altitude readings.
DCA air traffic controllers faced pressure to “make it work”
At the busy and complex airport outside Washington, D.C., with a high volume of traffic, investigators said air traffic controllers were expected to “make it work.” That sometimes included using an additional runway for arrivals, which occurred on the night of the accident.
When asked by an NTSB investigator if “making it work” meant compromising safety, former DCA tower operations manager Clark Allen said: “You’re pushing the line.”
The air traffic control tower at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Arlington, Virginia, is seen on February 3.
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The FAA is contending with a national shortage of air traffic controllers. But Nick Fuller, the FAA’s acting deputy chief operating officer, said staffing at DCA was commensurate with other similarly sized facilities.
Often at DCA tower, one controller would handle helicopter traffic while another would monitor fixed-wing aircraft. On the night of the accident, one controller was performing both of those roles, which FAA officials said was common at the airport.
FAA staff had warned about the helicopter route, but the agency didn’t act
Before the accident, FAA staff had raised concerns about the Army helicopter route’s proximity to commercial flights landing at the airport. The 12th Aviation Battalion’s Bravo Company, which operates out of Virginia’s Fort Belvoir, ran training missions in the area related to priority air transport and continuity-of-government operations.
Allen, the former DCA tower operations manager, said a working group at the airport had considered the possibility of moving what was known as Route 4 or even eliminating part of it. “And both of those options we were told we were unable to do due to continuity of government operations or security,” Allen said.
During the hearings, Homendy blasted the FAA for not acting on the safety concerns of its employees. “Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead! How do you explain that? Our bureaucratic process?” she said. “Fix it. Do better.”
In March, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy permanently restricted nonessential helicopter operations around DCA and eliminated mixed traffic between helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, such as commercial jets. Both actions were recommended by the NTSB.
